The key to this topic for me was a quote from Home
Secretary Jacqui Smith, "Individuals to have as much control and
ownership of their own data as possible," writes Andrea
Simmons, consultant forum manager, BCS Security
Forum.
In so many ways, it was a redundant thing to say, given that I,
as a data subject, retain the right to this automatically,
supported by the
Data
Protection Act and the
Human
Rights Act. I don't need a platitudinous diktat from government
indicating that they are doing me a new favour.
Rest assured, personally I'm in the camp of "chip me" - much
like the final episode of the BBC's drama
The Last Enemy.
I see no issue with the ease of access that should be afforded by a
willingness to engage in the system. But I know that this is not a
widely held view. Most especially as a result of the capability of
government-led IT projects to fall flat on their face in full
public view, meaning they lack the significant level of inspiration
required to engage the public into willing interaction.
The other difficulty with being inspired by a story at a given
time is that life has a habit of getting in the way of our thoughts
and intentions. Given the chaos that ensued at
Heathrow Terminal 5 during its opening week (a private sector
venture, it should be noted), the reasons behind the fingerprinting
of travellers (never mind the intended registration of airport
baggage handlers from 2009, as suggested in the ID Cards plans)
will no doubt have to be reconsidered.
The bigger picture involves needing to calm ruffled feathers and
prove that, where technology meets process, the UK has the
capability to deliver the goods on time, in time, every time.
Sadly, we don't appear to have sufficient evidence so far to be
able to reassure the concerned citizen, never mind potential
international visitors.
In fact, if you dovetail the intentions of T5 to fingerprint all
travellers, with the requirements of the ID cards scheme, then the
cynic could clearly make a "leap of faith" link that sees T5 being
on some kind of a bonus retainer to provide the government with
pre-collected information that could be used to populate an
appropriate database for the
Identity and Passport Service.
Think TIA (Total Information Awareness - The Last Enemy again), if
you will!
Also "the wider population may not have to get ID cards at all
and could opt to use biometric passports to prove who they are
instead," according to the Home Secretary. Either way, biometric
data is sensitive personal information and this requires extra care
in terms of collection, handling, storage and usage. Setting out to
use this requires building in layers of protection for the
information at all levels of interaction (picture the "7 stack
layer") and the provision of adequate training for all those
involved.
When faced with such contradictory reporting, "Support for the
national identity scheme remains stable, according to a survey of
more than 2,000 people carried out for the Home Office by
Taylor Nelson Sofres in
February. The research, released on 6 March 2008, found that 59% of
those questioned supported the scheme, while 23% did not."
Versus, "a survey by
ICM on 1,008 people,
also carried out in February (2008), found 50% in opposition with
47% in favour, using a question mentioning a likely price of £93
for a biometric passport".
Ultimately, whether the government's business case is "right",
only time will tell - but potentially the chasm that needs to be
bridged between the many ways this has been spun for the public and
their actual understanding and perception may be too wide to spend
time and resources on and perhaps a "leap of faith" has to be taken
by actually doing something active instead of navel gazing on the
subject still further.
Read more expert advice from the Computer Weekly Security Think
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