Trusted Computing initiatives from the big IT suppliers
could lessen the need for organisations to rely on the vigilance of
users to protect access to corporate data
Trusted Computing is an initiative subscribed to by technology
suppliers such as Intel, AMD, Microsoft and IBM to build affordable
security into PCs and servers at the processor level. The aim is to
make computers more secure by, for example, only allowing
authorised programs to be run, or encrypting data in hardware so
that it cannot be read or altered by unauthorised people.
Trusted Computing uses hardware components (the chip and chipsets)
and software components (the operating system and applications) to
secure computing activities. It has four main features:
Attestation lets other computers know that the computer is the
machine it claims to be, and is running the software it claims to
be running
Sealed storage allows the user to encrypt information so it can
only be accessed by a "trustworthy" application
Process isolation prevents one application from affecting
another
Secure input and output allows keystrokes to be encrypted and
decrypted. This ensures that no malicious software can record,
steal or modify keystrokes.
Microsoft's security software technology, formerly code-named
Palladium, is possibly the best-known Trusted Computing initiative.
It was renamed Next-Generation Secure Computing Base (NGSCB) in
January 2003, but the concept remains the same. It is being
developed by Microsoft's programmers for inclusion in the
forthcoming Longhorn version of the Windows operating system.
NGSCB is a set of software features in the operating system that
combine with specific secure hardware and applications to give
users greater data security, privacy, system integrity, network
security and content protection, says Microsoft.
NGSCB comes under the umbrella of Microsoft's Trustworthy Computing
initiative, outlined by company chairman Bill Gates at the start of
2002. Microsoft saw that internet-based transactions were on the
increase, and wanted to offer a system that would encourage users
to trust their computers, as well as the internet, with their
personal data, and also with financial, legal and other
transactions.
Peter Biddle, product unit manager in Microsoft's security business
unit, says, "NGSCB enables you to be sure that there are no viruses
or spyware running on your computer and that the computer you are
communicating with cannot interfere with your communications. It
opens the door to all kinds of secure transactions that are not
possible today."
According to Bryan Willman, a Microsoft Windows architect working
on NGSCB, the technology has many uses. "Suppose you run a pharmacy
company. When you test a new drug, of course it is bad if someone
has an adverse reaction to the drug, but it is much worse if
someone tampers with that data so that your results are
skewed.
"That means it is critical that all test data is entered accurately
and no one tampers with it. NGSCB ensures that those files cannot
be breached or modified in any way," he says.
Another example of how Trusted Computing could be used is where a
patient, doctor and pharmacist are communicating about the
patient's medical condition and they want to be sure that the
information they exchange is confidential and true, says
Willman.
"Today you probably would not want to do that online from your home
computer because there is no way to know for sure how safe your
information is. With NGSCB you use [one secure partition], and no
matter what is happening [in another partition], you can be sure
that the data passed between you and your doctor and your
pharmacist has not been tampered with."
Biddle says Microsoft expects its first customers to be
enterprises, for which the protection of intellectual property is
vitally important. "A lot of companies have information they need
to keep secret: medical data, personnel and legal records, drug
formulas, business plans. Worrying about protecting these types of
information keeps people awake at night," he says.
Another use of the technology is to protect customers, says
Willman. Using the trusted system, with its secure hardware and
application elements, the customer can securely transmit personal
data to a company, such as banking information. The company can be
sure it has been sent legitimate information, and the customer can
be sure the information will only be used for the purpose it was
sent for, because the software will specify that, says
Willman.
Bruce Schneier, founder and chief technology officer of Counterpane
Internet Security, says NGSCB technology provides protection
against two broad classes of attacks: automatic software attacks
such as viruses, Trojans and network-mounted exploits; and local
software-based attacks such as using debuggers to open the system
up.
Despite this, Palladium/NGSCB received plenty of bad press
concerning privacy in 2002. This was based on documents obtained
under the US Freedom of Information Act from the National Institute
of Standards and Technology, which described Palladium's
applications for digital rights management (DRM). The technology
embeds "unique machine identifiers," and therefore raises the risk
that user behaviour could be subject to traffic analysis. The other
function of DRM was to potentially give commercial software and
content suppliers control over a user's PC to retain control of
licences and prevent piracy.
"The technology lends itself to digital rights control, and people
thought that was the primary function of Palladium, so it got a lot
of bad press. But it did a lot more than DRM," says Stuart Okin,
associate partner at professional services company Accenture and
former Microsoft UK security chief.
Schneier says, "There are security features that tie programs and
data to the CPU and to the user, and encrypt them for privacy.
Palladium is inexorably tied up with DRM. Your computer will have
several partitions, each of which will be able to read and write
its own data.
"There is nothing in Palladium that prevents someone else from
setting up a partition on your computer and putting stuff there
that you cannot get at. Microsoft has repeatedly said that it is
not going to mandate DRM, or try to control DRM systems, but
clearly Palladium was designed with DRM in mind."
Microsoft declined to comment on whether the technology still
retains a focus on DRM, but a spokesman said, "NGSCB is evolving,
but at this point we do not have an update on NGSCB to share. We
intend to maintain our focus on security while delivering a broader
set of benefits in terms of utility and flexibility. Microsoft
continues to actively work through many of the technical details
and we expect to be able to provide more details in the near
future."
In November 2003, at the European RSA Conference, Microsoft
demonstrated an early prototype of NGSCB, running on a prototype of
Intel's chip-level LaGrande technology (LT), and showed features to
help protect data against a series of sophisticated software
attacks. NGSCB is scheduled to be included as part of Windows
Longhorn, which is expected mid-2006.
On the hardware side, NGSCB is believed to work with both Intel's
LT, as well as the Trusted Computing Group's Trusted Platform
Module specification for chip-level security products.
Intel has been developing LT for years as part of its Safer
Computing Initiative, but says it is not expected to be available
in business desktops and mobiles for another two or three
years.
Intel chief executive Paul Otellini says LT is designed to deliver
"protected execution, protected memory and protected storage" using
hardware. It protects against software-based attacks, and supports
the creation of the parallel protected environments supported by
Microsoft's NGSCB technology.
Whereas LT protects the environment within the computer system, the
Trusted Computing Group's Trusted Platform Module authenticates the
system to the outside world, and is available now.
The TCG is a group of 95 organisations, and is promoted by AMD,
Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Sony and Sun Microsystems.
It was formed in 2003 to develop and support open industry
standards for trusted computing across multiple platforms.
IBM has been shipping laptops with the Trusted Platform Module in
it since 2003, and last October IBM introduced a Thinkpad notebook
with an embedded chip security system and a fingerprint reader. The
reader is built into the wrist-rest of some Thinkpad T42 models, so
users can swipe their finger across a horizontal sensor to log on
to systems, applications, databases and even websites. Passwords
and log-ins are encrypted with the security chip.
Since 2003, open standards organisation the Trusted Computing Group
has developed several technology building blocks and common
interfaces for manufacturers to use in their products. The Trusted
Platform Module is one of these building blocks: a microcontroller
that stores digital security keys, passwords and digital
certificates, and is typically fixed to the motherboard of a
PC.
Using open standards, it can potentially be used in any computing
device that requires these functions. It can ensure that
information stored within hardware is secure from external software
attack and physical theft. According to the Trusted Computing
Group, critical applications and capabilities such as secure
e-mail, secure web access, and local protection of data can be made
more secure using its platform.
The Trusted Platform Module's security works by using public and
private key encryption on the chip to enable highly secure storage
of files and other digital secrets. It is currently at version
1.2.
Fred Cohen, principal analyst at Burton Group, says chip-based
encryption and security is good for firms that want to encrypt or
secure their data at the hardware level. "The Trusted Computing
Group has shipped more than 20 million computer systems with these
capabilities. It is a standards-based approach that has the support
of most of the larger players in the computing industry."
Okin says IBM and other manufacturers have produced computers that
use Trusted Platform Module version 1.1, but that these are limited
in their functions by a lack of operating system support.
"The problem is that beyond the basic hardware and Rom protection
the operating systems do not use it at the moment. Where it will
become exciting is with the next generation, where the operating
systems and applications become more aware, and use these new
security standards. But it depends on operating systems such as
Longhorn, and whether Unix and Linux are taking on the
standard."