We can't write secure code

David Lacey makes the important point that writing secure software is “not just about cutting secure code or developing better testing tools. We need to get things right much earlier in the development process.” It’s a subject I’ve been harping on about for some time, with many references to excellent resources such as OWASP, and great leaders on the subject such as Mark Curphey.

Over the last few years I’ve heard many solutions proposed to fix the problem of insecure software, ranging from sacking the developers to improving the software development lifecycle so that security requirements are stated from outset and followed through into production and beyond. The evidence is that none of it works. OK, the folk at Microsoft, for example, will say that security is now embedded in their culture, and they’ve certainly generated a nice new stream of revenue for themselves out of all the books, tools and journals on the subject. But they are still releasing security patches with a frequency and schedule that the I wish the rail company I use each day could achieve with their trains. And other vendors are coming up with clangers at an alarming rate. For example, this latest one from leading CMS vendor RedDot. An SQL Injection vulnerability in an enterprise level CMS system – what were they playing at with their quality control?!

So, here’s the thing. We can’t write secure code. It’s true. Can you show me any decent commercial, consumer focused product (that people actually want to use – not just techies who haven’t seen daylight in 12 years and live on a diet of digestive biscuits) that is secure from the off as soon as it’s exposed to the Internet and where 12 months later it hasn’t required a patch of some sort? Systems are simply too complicated with too many lines of code for anyone to expect that they can be released without containing bugs and security holes. That doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t try, it just means that we should take a different approach. That approach, in my opinion, is to take a leaf out of the new edition of the PCI standards and stick a ruddy great application firewall in front of everything. That doesn’t make the code secure, it’s a sticking plaster over a wound. But – to continue the analogy – a plaster stops the bleeding, prevents germs getting in, and while it’s not a cure, it’s good enough.

I’m not knocking OWASP et al. It’s the first resource I recommend developers go to and will remain so. Just that the business expects more functionality, cheaper costs, more complexity, better performance, and a more rapid deployment for its products. Chucking in security with all that lot is like rubbing your belly and patting your head at the same time, while riding a motorbike. So, let’s make it easy on ourselves. Application firewalls!

SearchCIO
SearchSecurity
SearchNetworking
SearchDataCenter
SearchDataManagement
Close