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Cornwall privatisation hangs in the balance

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Cornwall Council's unpopular plans for back-office privatisation are hanging in the balance after councillors complained they didn't know enough about it to give it their consent.

The proposal to outsource £800m of council services to either BT or CSC would turn Cornwall into a pioneer for a radical new model of local government in which councils become aggressive commercial competitors.

Cornwall's plan would put it in direct competition with an outsource venture in nearby Somerset, which has been struggling ever since Cornwall refused to join it in 2007. Somerset's venture, called Southwest One, had struggled because it couldn't drum up enough business. Now both Cornwall and Somerset will be climbing over one other as they try to convince other councils around the UK to privatise their back-offices using each of their profit making ventures.

The free-for-all was launched when the coalition government introduced an 'anything goes' law for local authorities in March. Called the general power of competence, it allowed councils to operate services for profit.

But with councillors and electors struggling to understand the implications of the change, and to comprehend why Cornwall should be embracing it, the Conservative-led council has already come near the point of no return in its deal-broking with BT and CSC.

Council leader Alec Robertson said yesterday he would put the privatisation proposal to the mercy of the council later this month, when councillors will vote on whether to keep it.

He had already told councillors it was too late to go back after they voted against the proposal on 4 September. But they called a no-confidence vote against him, to be held on 16 October, and opposition Labour councillors organised a petition to bring the issue back before the council chamber.

"If the majority of councillors vote against the proposal when its brought to full council, hopefully on 23 October, it won't go ahead," Robertson told BBC Radio Cornwall yesterday.

He said councillors only withheld their approval because "they didn't have enough information to make a properly informed decision".

Doom

But while the Council Cabinet had legal power to go ahead with the unpopular deal, Robertson conceded it would be "doomed to fail" if the council opposed it, because people would make sure it didn't work.

Somerset's outsource venture had been thus doomed after the 2009 election brought in a Conservative council who opposed it. It has since embraced the general power of competence in a desperate attempt to avert financial collapse. The bid will only work if it can convince enough councils to privatise their back-offices with its venture and not Cornwall's.

When Somerset launched Southwest One in 2007 it had aimed to get 36 public bodies across Southwest England to merge their back-offices into one company. The original plan included local authorities in Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, Gloucestershire, Somerset and Wiltshire. But in the end only three Somerset bodies joined in, by selling 75 per cent ownership of their IT, accounts, human resources and purchasing departments to IBM.

Now Cornwall councillors now have to decide whether they should outsource at all. Their Council Cabinet has told them that if they don't approve the venture Cornish back-office jobs will end up being acquired by another council's outsource venture somewhere down the line; and that if they do approve it, jobs will be created in Cornwall, presumably the spoils of battle against other councils in this new private/public market.

Southwest One creative accounting for dummies

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Burrowdridge - Tuanton Deane - Somerset.jpgIt was lucky for Southwest One that it misplaced the majority of invoices sent by its parent, IBM, when it published its erroneous 2010 accounts in January.

It was already facing bankruptcy and Somerset County Council, its lead outsource partner, was trying to cut its contract. The missing invoices would have increased its losses 25 per cent to over £40m. It might have been the end of SW1.

It was lucky for IBM as well. As 75 per cent owner, IBM's reputation as an outsource service provider was riding on this, its flagship local government venture. With central government spending drying up and the coalition government pushing the privatisation of municipal offices, market research firm Kable has predicted that local government outsourcing will be the main source of growth for the public sector IT industry in the UK.

This was no minor incident. You don't lose £10m of invoices, amounting to 73 per cent of your run rate cost of goods and services from your parent, down the back of the sofa.

SW1 was past the worse of its troubles when it found the invoices six months later and restated its 2010 accounts. But it would still have trouble explaining why Somerset CC didn't know about the £10m additional losses when it renegotiated its contract.

Another stroke of luck


Here, SW1 and IBM had luck on their side again. SW1 was able to bury the additional IBM costs in the notes of its accounts by offsetting them - by cancelling them out. But this was not normal. You can't just offset your losses against thin air and pretend they don't exist.

So how did SW1 bury the IBM invoices? It was like a card trick: it pulled something from its sleeve. That was a £9.512m credit note from IBM. By presenting the credit note in the notes of its 2010 accounts, it cancelled out the rediscovered invoices. Hence they could stay in the notes of the accounts. And the front page of the restated numbers - the headline costs and losses - could meanwhile remain unchanged. Anyone who looked at the accounts would be told, 'Nothing to see here - carry on!'.

But the £9.512m was curious. IBM did not give SW1 a credit note for £10m to cover the cost of the rediscovered invoices - although even that would have looked dodgy, or erroneous. It gave SW1 a credit note for the cost of the £10m invoices after they were balanced against a variety of other minor credits and deficits in its restated cost account that had nothing to do with IBM. This was just enough, in other words, to bury the loss.

With the loss buried, the news that broke about SW1's accounts in August was that its finances were better than they used to be. But they were in fact worse than it was letting on.

Of course, this could all have been a succession of terrible but wholly innocent mistakes. They have indeed thus far proved so embarrassing that SW1 has refused to talk about them.

IBM checks and balances

There might have been a legitimate reason why SW1 lost £10m of invoices from its parent. SW1 and IBM finance executives might also have thought they had a plausible explanation for IBM's fees being 73 per cent lower in 2010 when they signed the accounts off in January. They would presumably have demanded an explanation if they didn't already know where this £10m had gone. They would presumably have tried to tally the invoices in IBM's own financial records with the purchase orders in SW1's. Such things are presumably done automatically by computer between IBM and its subsidiaries. A management accountant would presumably press a button to produce such a report. They would have presumably have done at least that much to verify that a drastic fall in IBM costs was help from Heaven and not some horrible mistake. IBM would presumably make efforts to account for £10m of invoices to one of its subsidiaries, no matter how trifling the figure is on its own $26bn accounts. Count the pennies and the pounds will look after themselves.

Similar conjectures might be made reasonably of the £9.512m IBM credit note SW1 attributed to the period that ended 31 December 2010 - that it attributed not when it filed its accounts in January but when it restated them six months later.

It is not as though SW1 didn't have enough time to get the accounts right. It
filed them four months late. And it has set itself up as a backoffice for local government, whose accounting is more efficient because it is automated.

There was one more lucky break for SW1 in January. If it hadn't filed its accounts so late it wouldn't have first secured a £10m mortgage from IBM - which it did two days before the filing on 17 January. Though it couldn't officially use this to credit its 2010 accounts, it did allow Derek Pretty, SW1 chairman, to claim the venture was a going concern when he signed off them off and went into the final stage of contract negotiations with Somerset CC.


Southwest One Payments to IBM - Against Revenue - 2008 to 2011 - Restated.png



Southwest One Payments from Somerset - to IBM - 2008 to 2011.pngSouthwest One published its 2010 accounts in January 2012.

It reported 2010 payments to IBM, its parent, were down 73 per cent.

Such a drastic fall in the single largest item in its cost account was relief at a time when SW1 was in crisis.

Finance staff passed SW1's 2010 accounts without apparently clarifying the drastic fall in payments to IBM over 2009.

SW1 restated its 2010 accounts six months later.

It's payments to IBM had not been so low after all.

They had in fact been over 80 per cent of revenue.
Payments to Southwest One by Public Bodies - 2008 to 2011.png
But SW1 had suffered a drastic cut in payments from Somerset Council.

Somerset had been SW1's biggest outsource partner. But it cut payments in half after Conservatives took power in 2009.

Of SW1's other outsource partners: one cut only 19%; the other actually increased payments by 70%.

But SW1's IBM costs were put in stark relief.






Somerset goes national to stem outsource losses

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Somerset County Council's private sector spin-off is going national in the hope of reversing its financial losses and exploiting government cuts in other regions.

The outsource shared services venture, called Southwest One, has already begun bidding for contracts to privatize backoffices for the NHS, as well as other councils. It hopes to drum up sales it failed to generate among local authorities in South West England after launching as a joint venture with IBM in 2007.

Derek Pretty, SW1 chairman, said in his annual statement last week it was counting on government cuts to make its services more attractive to other local authorities.

"The result of cuts is that all public authorities must seek new ways to reduce expenditure. This places the company in a position of being able to provide a solution to the problems faced by Authorities," said Pretty. "The opportunities for expansion are believed to be feasible."

"SWO has responded to invitations to tender and has hosted several visits to Taunton and Portishead from interested parties - including County Councils, District Councils and Police Forces as well as NHS representatives.

"The customer base is currently restricted to public sector bodies in the South West of England. Future development is to focus on expanding the customer base to other public sector organisations throughout the United Kingdom."

Somerset Council originally intended for SW1 to run the backoffices of up to 34 public authorities across South West England when it put the tender out in 2005. It had only one other partner by the time it signed its contract with IBM in 2007 - Taunton Deane District Council - though it still held out for business with all 34 original contenders. It eventually secured three.

Now other public bodies such as London Metropolitan University are seeking to replicate Somerset, by turning their backoffices into launch assets for private joint ventures with outsource suppliers. Aping Somerset's revised strategy, London Met also intends its outsource venture to bid nationally to rip and replace the backoffices of other authorities with its own rented services.

Roop Singh, global head of consulting services for Wipro, one of three outsource suppliers short-listed for the London Met bid, said such a venture setting up from scratch would have to bring in about four or five partners before it could break even.

Then it could expect to deliver savings of between 25 and 30 per cent a year by consolidating - that is, cutting - the software, hardware and employees of the merged organisations, he said.

David Orr, a former SW1 employee who campaigns for greater transparency and accountability in outsource ventures, said SW1 had originally signed its 34 participating authorities up to a European procurement framework so they could buy its services without the usual legal hurdles. But the framework would have run out last year, he said. SW1's sales outside its core three partners have been less than 10 per cent of revenue.

SW1's posted its fourth consecutive financial loss last Thursday, while its relationship with Somerset County Council (SCC), its lead public sector partner, has descended into a legal dispute over its poor performance.

Southwest One emits hot air after near-collapse

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Failed IBM outsourcing venture Southwest One became a cause célèbre in Somerset last week, with the council leader damning it so loudly he almost sounded like he might do something about it.

But it was all hot air. And it had the stink of opportunism, what with Somerset being in the middle of renegotiations over its 10-year Southwest One contract. Southwest One was nevertheless forced to respond. But when it did, it merely gave a blast of hot air as well: giving the same assurances that it has been giving Somerset for the last four and a half years. Yes, there was a right pong hanging over Somerset last week.

It all started letting off after Computer Weekly exposed the terrible state of the IBM venture's finances.

Southwest One had appeared on the verge of bankruptcy in the 2010 accounts that Chairman Derek Pretty signed off just last month.

CW asked SW1 whether IBM had saved it from bankruptcy with the £10m mortgage it extended last month. It ignored our questions.

Council leader Ken Maddock had meanwhile used his annual budget statement before a full council meeting last Wednesday to give SW1 a dressing down.

SW1 had been a failure, he repeatedly told councillors. His words reverberated around the county. He called SW1 a failure no fewer than eight times in his brief speech. SW1 had failed to give the people of Somerset value for money, good prices or flexibility, he said.

So he was presumably going to cancel the contract or at least do something more convincing than what Somerset had been doing over the four years in which SW1 consistently failed to deliver on the promises IBM made on its behalf in 2007? No, actually.

"We [will] continue to do all we can to make Southwest One work," he said.

But there is one thing Maddock will be doing after his speech. He'll be back to renegotiations over the SW1 contract. The media squall that followed his outburst will have done Somerset's negotiating position no harm at all.

And there was something else he would do: more outsourcing. He had embarked on a review of what other things the council could outsource to joint ventures like SW1.

"Almost half our most vital services are carried out by private sector or not for profit organisations - we will look to increase this where appropriate," he said, failing to note the unbelievable irony of it.

SW1 answered Maddock by claiming it was still on track to make savings for the council.

"We have negotiated contracts that will deliver savings of at least £71m for the partners over the next few years, of which they have implemented £15m to date," it said.

But it had been repeating this statement during the four years that its directors were forced in January to write-off as an accounting loss.

IBM had in 2007 promised £192m of over 10 years. SW1's failure to deliver these savings had been apparent to critics in 2009. It answered them by claiming it had "identified" savings of £65m.

"It has claimed an early success in procurement, identifying £65m in savings and declaring that it is on course to deliver £200m over the 10 year life of the contract," said The Guardian after an interview with Somerset chief executive Alan Jones in 2009.

An internal review commissioned by then newly elected Somerset council leader Ken Maddock found in 2010 that SW1 had delivered just £2m of its promised savings. The earlier identified £65m savings were nowhere to be seen.

SW1 reassured councillors in 2010 it had identified savings of £45m. It had accumulatively identified savings now of £110m.

But SW1 admitted in its statement last week it had actually delivered just £15m. Identified savings were now £71m.

Little appears to have changed, apart the now wide acknowledgement of SW1's failure. SW1 may refuse to admit it in statements to the press, but its directors were forced to admit it in not so many words in its 2010 accounts. They had been forced to tear up its business model and start again.

Its bankruptcy was also apparent. It couldn't pay its debts. Its directors doubted it would cover them by the time it had reached the end of the 10-year outsourcing contract into which it had been spun-off from Somerset County Council in 2007. It was about half-way through its £0.5bn term and its directors couldn't even foresee how to cover its £17m start-up costs.

SW1 directors had been so embroiled with their troubles they were four months late filing their accounts. They only did so after IBM had given them a £10m mortgage. They said they had a new business model. This time it would deliver. They didn't say what it was.

Cosy cloud coterie snuggles into top nob govIT jobs

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Mmmmmits snug at the top. Especially if you're Julian David, IBM's top UK salesman, who last week was picked to be Director General of Intellect, the ICT oligopoly's trade association.

It's only three years since David bagged the sale of the century, getting the Cabinet Office to re-badge IBM's cloud computing slogan as HM G-Cloud. Now he's not only got the cosiest seat in the business, but Andy Nelson, his apprentice on the G-Cloud programme, has been appointed government CIO at the Cabinet Office, the most senior job in government IT.

Imagine how made up David was when, chuckling over his cognac at the Intellect hearth, he learns that Nelson, Ministry of Justice CIO and senior responsible owner for HM G-Cloud, would be his opposite number in government.

How cosy it will be round the fireside when the pair are joined by Cabinet Office permanent secretary Ian Watmore, who was Nelson's colleague at Anderson Consulting (later known as Accenture) for seven years after they joined the 1980 intake.

How quaint last March's government ICT strategy now seems, with Cabinet Office minister Francis Maude vowing to "put an end to the oligopoly of large suppliers that monopolise [government] ICT provision".

Julian David - IBM - Intellect.pngAll that puff and bluster for aught

David moves into office at a crucial time for IBM. All his work promoting the G-Cloud is about to come to fruition. But it will need an extra push to get public bodies around the country to swallow it, close all their data centres, sack all their techies and give all their computer systems over to IBM or whichever branch of Acme Data Corp. they happen to buddy. That's what the G-Cloud promises.

David's just the man for the job. For though his 28-year career at IBM was officially terminated in 2010, he has an unrivalled track record selling IT industry fads.

He was there in 1998 as IBM's European Marketing director, flogging the Year 2000 bug fix to a terrified public, telling them it would be "the kiss of death" to anyone who didn't fix it.

He was there again flogging disastrous Enterprise Resource Planning systems in the millennial boom years.

The fateful year SAP began selling IT disasters to the retail industry, there was David again as ERP marketing director at the Retail Industry Unit of IBM, telling supermarkets how by spending mere hundreds of millions of pounds they could turn reliable old systems into ones that would burn their money more efficiently.

Andy Nelson - Government CIO.pngRetailers lapped it up. Andy Nelson, our new government CIO, was there in 1997 - lapping it up as Asda director of computer services, though only as long as it took to outsource the supermarket's computing to IBM.

Asda's then new CEO Allan Leighton did the deal after returning from a Harvard MBA programme. Two Harvard professors came to see it went smoothly.



Bad reputation

ian watmore DIUS Expo 08 Manchester Uni.jpgIt might not have gone so smoothly, but it certainly gave the eggheads something to think about when that first raft of ERP deals came to fruition in the mid-noughties.

MFI's £50m IBM SAP implementation led to losses and two boardroom scalps.

Sainsbury's had outsourced its entire IT in a £1.8bn deal with Accenture, then overseen by Ian Watmore. Four years later, its first ever net loss was attributed to supply chain and IT problems.

Sainsbury's kicked Accenture out and wrote off £260m IT spend. Bringing its IT back in-house was said to have helped turn the business around. Its management still denounces outsourcing, "unequivocally".

Angela Morrison, the woman who kicked Accenture out of Sainsbury's, had earlier kicked IBM out of Asda, undoing the work our new man Nelson had done in 1997.

Asda's subsequent, do-it-yourself SAP implementation was so successful it was rolled out across the rest of Walmart, its parent. Walmart's success was said to stem from doing its own IT, because it was too integral to trust to an outsourcer.

Other companies followed suit. JP Morgan bank terminated its $5bn IBM outsourcing contract in 2005. It had been the largest such deal in banking. Even Gartner, cheerleader for the US IT industry, admitted it was "time to stop compulsive outsourcing".

Worse still for IBM, the dotcom bust had forced the private sector to freeze IT spend. So IBM and its ilk turned on the public sector, which was famously the only sector spending any money. Watmore was now in government, overseeing the spending.

That's where Julian David pitched up after retail. As vice president of IBM public sector business he started flogging the same big outsourcing deals that had gone tits up in the private sector.

There was some good news to boost his chances.

Rob Fraser - Sainsbury's IT Director - receiving 2011 CIO of the Year award.png Boots terminated a £710m IBM outsourcing contract only half-way through its term in 2007, apparently because it had been so successful its modernisation finished early.

But Boots vowed never to put all its eggs in one basket ever again.

Rob Fraser, its group IT director (now at anti-outsourcer Sainsbury's), said outsource suppliers had no interest in helping customers cut the cost of their IT.


With friends like these...


But outsourcers were now busy trashing their reputations in the public sector. They made such a good job of it that government IT became synonymous with disaster. And government is going through the same re-evaluation of outsourcing industry went through in the mid-noughties.

This is the apparent legacy of John Higgins, Intellect boss for 14 years. He became head of the CSSA in 1998 and rode the rise and fall, consolidation of power, establishment of a bankrupt contractual model, left a trail of IT disaster stories and an industry with a reputation for bodge and exploitation - a reputation that became so well established the coalition government was able to define itself in opposition to it - to define Labour as the government of big-state IT failures. Government has denounced his trade association's membership and methods as the corollary of Labour IT. It has tried to mend their mutual record of kaput computing by rallying tech entrepreneurs not normally associated with Intellect.

On the occasion of David's appointment last week Intellect issued a press release in which the DG-designate said he looked forward to doing his bit to improve skills in the industry and support SMEs.

CW asked Intellect for David's SME credentials, Intellect said he had wide experience and had worked with SMEs.

Burmuda.pngDavid used to flog computers to SMEs as vice president of IBM's SME business. But his SME credentials consist of just eight months as a board director of EGS Group, a £3m company that had worked with him on the Cabinet Office G-Cloud plans in 2010.

He left EGS in May 2011 to open a UK office for Hong Kong-based, Bermuda-registered, Azeus.

...who needs SMEs?

David's SME credentials do not compare well with the notable notches he marked up as big business honcho at IBM.

The most notable of his recent achievements was an infamous £400m outsourcing deal by which IBM sought to gain control of public computing across the entire South West England. It is hard to imagine this megalomaniacal plan having any regard for SMEs.

Flush with the Boots boost in 2007, IBM formalised an agreement in principle to subsume the IT functions of 36 councils and emergency services in Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, Somerset, Gloucestershire and Wiltshire.

It initially involved IBM taking 75 per cent ownership of a public-private partnership called SouthWest One and acquiring the IT functions of Somerset and Taunton Deane Councils and Avon & Somerset Police.

It would implement a SAP system to run them and deliver £192m savings over 10 years. David said the project would cut costs and boost the local economy. But it floundered.

The SAP implementation went awry. A report by Somerset County Council Review Panel in 2010 said participating councils would have to renegotiate their contract before they would realise the savings IBM promised at the outset.

Alan Jones - former CEO of Somerset County Council.pngThe then Somerset CEO Alan Jones had earlier denied specific allegations of SAP problems and contract failures made by Ian Liddell-Grainger, local MP.

£65m of savings had already been booked, Jones claimed in 2009. The 2010 report said the venture had delivered only £2m of savings, had no clear idea how it would produce the rest and could anyway conceive only an estimated £45m cut in procurement costs.

The affair was murky, with Unison and councillors complaining about unwarranted secrecy. IBM had blocked an ITV reporter from using a little-known public scrutiny law to view the contract. Liddell-Grainger made unsubstantiated allegations of corruption. Jones got embroiled in grubby in-fighting with councillors.


David personally played an important part in turning this trashy reputation into a revamped sales story for outsourcers. Called the cloud, it was a transcendental vision worthy of the late 90s ERP pitch.

The cloud was a rebranding of ideas already in David's public sector pitch in 2007: departmental silos were bad, paying IBM to consolidate your data centres and virtualize your systems was good. Asset re-use was the carrot on the stick.

The fully formed cloud pitch was essentially outsourcing with dodgy bits stuck on. It promised to cut costs, cut jobs and deploy a radically new sort of computer system.

Julian David Presents RBWM plans for UK LAs to cloud at Intellect - Cloud Presentation - 11 October 2010.pngIt'll be different this time

As president of Socitm in 2010, Jos Creese promoted those same ideas, proposing local authorities sack computing staff and buy services instead from the cloud.

Creese fell in with David in 2006 when as CIO of Hampshire County Council (home of IBM HQ) he did a five year deal to rent an enterprise architecture made of elements that would later underpin IBM's cloud.

Hampshire had at the time just celebrated the successful installation of an SAP system. Council IT staff had done the installation themselves. Hampshire systems were running £2m-a-year more efficiently.

Creese's ideas echoed those touted by Ian Trenholm, CEO at the Royal Borough of Windsor & Maidenhead, a council with intimate ties to the coalition government. David's cloud pitch did too.

The shared idea was that if councils standardised their business processes, their organisations would readily plug into the cloud.

Margaret Miller - Accenture - former Sainsbury's CIO.pngSainsbury's had adopted the same ideas for its abortive Accenture transformation in 2000 - the one that led the supermarket to realise how IT was too important to entrust to someone else.

Margaret Miller, its then CIO, said how was trying to adopt standard business processes so it could use commodity computer systems. Miller now advises government customers for Accenture.

Pompous postlude

The idea runs contrary to the bottom-up noises the coalition government made before coming into power.

It runs contrary also to agile and lean, the empowering methods to which government has turned in the hope of reversing the trend for moronic public computer ventures - methods more akin to Sainsbury's, Asda and Hampshire in the days when they took IT into their own hands.

The Cabinet Office is meanwhile making a song and dance about getting SMEs into the G-Cloud. But the cloud will ultimately be a greater force for consolidation than economic regeneration.

When every council in the South West is using the same business processes, IBM's SouthWest One will be able to make a better case for subsuming their IT. The G-Cloud may not, as we are told, be a greater opportunity for SMEs, but merely something that must be made to accommodate SMEs so they are not excluded entirely.

Placatory postscript

John Higgins presents an award to an IT company for being an IT company.png
David will have to work hard to prove his SME talk is anything more than hot air. He will have to work harder to rescue the legacy left by Higgins, who you might think a decent man who has done good work, but showed poor judgement by staying in office after the wind changed.

As it happens, your jaded correspondent has had the good fortune to meet the new DG, and was struck at what a jolly good chap he appeared to be. That might better qualify him for the job than any publicity guff about SMEs, for the current bout of government-led reforms have striven for genuine collaboration to replace the adversarial relationships that defined its relationship with ICT suppliers in the past. But what industry really needs is a reformer, not a placatory pair of hands.

Is £400m IBM deal with Somerset jinxed?

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We're beginning to feel sorry for IBM. It has worked so hard to make a success of its £400m joint venture with Somerset County Council. But ...

1) A SAP go-live goes wrong and the council ends up apologising to staff.

2) The Tories, who'd frowned on the joint venture when they were in opposition, end up as Somerset County Council's ruling party.

3) The council's leader, Alan Jones, who'd been the most ardent supporter of the joint venture, leaves.

4) The model organisation doesn't get its accounts filed on time - which is a gift for council staff who oppose the deal.

5) The deal ends up on BBC News for the wrong reasons - the new Tory leader wants an inquiry into the contract amid complaints of leaks.

6) Richard Jones, the CEO of the joint venture, announces that he's taking early retirement.


**

Now the IBM-owned joint venture has conceded that it has - horror of horrors - got its own name wrong. Companies House has told the joint venture it is "not conforming to legal requirements".

In other words it's breaking the law. All because it calls itself "Southwest One" when it has a different registered name: South West One.

The problem began when the name South West One was registered very early in the life of the joint venture, and then it became known as Southwest One.

Surely an easy thing to fix?

Nope.

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