PayPal's 133 million online customers are the biggest
ocean phishers have to plunder. CISO Michael Barrett wants to make
it safe to be in the water; and he's not going at it alone. Backed
by PayPal's sophisticated fraud models and help from ISPs and
browser makers, Barrett is succeeding in protecting the
most-spoofed brand on the Internet.
![]() | ![]() | ![]() | ![]() | ![]() | Our view is that we're completely
standards agnostic, we simply want to do something that
works. Michael Barrett,
CISO, PayPal |
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Can you quantify losses due to phishing for PayPal?
Michael Barrett: Forty-one basis points is the total fraud number
[on PayPal's fraud model], and we don't break out where phishing is
in that overall mix. I will say: it isn't very high on that list.
That's one of the issues here; there is a perception there is a
huge problem, whereas the financials don't indicate that. Part of
the issue is there's been a certain amount of hype about the
magnitude of the problem from a financial sense. I don't at all
discount the perception impact, but I don't think the financial
impact is what some elements are saying it is.
How does PayPal defend against phishing?
Barrett: One of the back-end defenses we have is a lot of fraud
modeling. It's very advanced, and it's resulted in extremely low
fraud rates compared to the rest of the financial services
industry. We've gotten very good detecting fraud on the back end,
so what's [the phishers'] response? They generate more mail on the
front end.
How do you counter that?
Barrett:
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There are technology solutions out there. For a couple of years the
industry has been talking about email signing, but not much has
happened. We had a standards bifurcation argument with one camp
going with Sender Policy Framework, the other camp going with
domain keys. Our view is that we're completely standards agnostic,
we simply want to do something that works. At the moment, we're
already 100 percent signing all PayPal outbound email with both SPF
and with domain keys. The difficulty is for the average consumer,
it's hard to look at an email signature in header and figure out if
it's legitimate.
You've engaged ISPs as well?
Barrett: If you look at ISP coverage of customers, there are about
a half-dozen ISPs that account for 50 percent of the world's email
(Yahoo, AOL, MSN, gmail). We're working with them to say 'You have
our full permission, if a piece of email comes in your front door
and it purports to originate from us, but it isn't signed by us,
just drop it.' We don't want our customers seeing it.
Once we get that implemented, it'll take some time, that covers
50 percent of our customers. The other 50 percent is more
difficult, because there are hundreds of ISPs and all of them are
below 1 percent of customer coverage. The strategy there is to work
with tool vendors of email clients to make it much more obvious
that, yes this email is legitimate and signed, that way a consumer
can discriminate between legitimate email and phish mail.
What impact will the new Extended Validation certificates
have on phishing?
Barrett: Those are just a form of SSL certificate, the difference
being you have to go through a very thorough inspection process
before the CA issues it. It took three weeks for PayPal to go
through that process, digging up articles of incorporation, getting
an officer of the company to sign the request and list out who is
authorised to issue certificates. It's a detailed process, and it's
pretty effective at ensuring only legitimate companies that have
been in business for a period of time and they've got a strong
paper trail can do this. It's very hard for a fly-by-night operator
to get one.
We've already enabled Paypal.com to support EV certificates,
users will be able to see the green glow in the address bar, see
our name oscillating between us and VeriSign. IE7 has a good
phishing detection system built in. It's good at catching
blacklisted phishing sites and has good heuristic tools to spot
likely looking phishing
How much can you share about your fraud models?
Barrett: They're internally developed. We don't talk about what
they do, because honestly this is one of those areas where the more
you disclose about what the models are looking for, the more you're
telling the bad guy how to evade them.
They're broad-based, real-time front- and back-end inspection
models. They look at a number of variables around behavioral
patterns to determine whether a customer is who they say they are.
There's a lot of good stuff in there. But the proof of the pudding
is in the eating: our fraud rating is 41 basis points, or less than
a half of 1%. That is substantially lower than any credit card
company That's what proves it; those models drive fraud numbers
down.
What levels of sophistication are you seeing with phishing
attempts?
Barrett: Eighteen months ago, you could spot most phishing
attempts--grammatical errors, sites with kludgy graphics. Clearly,
they've gotten more professional since. There's way fewer errors
being made that are giving away the fact that a piece of phishing
mail has arrived or it's a phishing site you've arrived upon.
In terms of phishing attacks, not much is new. The basic model
is the same: they convey a sense of urgency. The crime is the same
as it was. We're seeing increasing levels of vertical
specialisation in the criminal community. One guy focuses on a
sliver of crime. That has increased.
How much responsibility should ISPs and carriers take for
filtering phishing in the Internet cloud?
Barrett: That's a difficult question. The difficulty is, how do you
incent someone who doesn't make more money if they address the
problem or help you with a strategic goal. It's a question of how
to link the problem to them so they get engaged. It is all about
industry cooperation and dragging people into that
communication.