Like theNHS National Programme for IT,
theMinistry of Defence's Defence
Information Infrastructure [DII] is unarguably a good idea. But it
is a good idea impeded by the practicalities.
Is it really possible to bring together on a single
Windows-based infrastructure hundreds of varied systems which
operate at different levels of security at hundreds of defence
sites at all three services, the army, navy and air force? We have
our doubts.
If it all works it could save huge sums being spent on
perpetuating a variety of systems. It could also help troops at, or
near, the front line where information is presented to them from
different systems that do not always talk to each other.
But £5bn is a lot of money to risk on a project that may or may
not work. And disruption at MoD sites may sometimes be too serious
to be trivialised as the inevitable result of a new system bedding
down.
Computer Weekly and Channel Four News has learned, as part of
our joint investigation, that the rollout of the DII project to the
Infantry Guided Weapons integrated project team may significantly
affect the work they do.
It is likely these problems will be resolved in time. Or they
could be symptomatic of a project that, in its original concept, is
too complicated, too ambitious. A great idea does not justify an
impractical proposition.
The DII cannot fail completely - 16,000 systems have been
delivered. But the plan is for 150,000 standardised terminals to be
installed across 2,000 MoD sites worldwide. That looks to us to be
a grand hope. It may not be possible given the current difficulties
and shortages of money.
Installing new hardware is not always difficult - the big
challenge is to migrate data accurately and reliably and run tried
and tested systems on the new infrastructure.
This is a huge problem even without the challenges of trying to
standardise on applications that work under different security
levels. And then there are difficulties such as cabling in
barracks, under runways, and in organisations that seem routinely
to change shape and size. Roles and locations of thousands of
personnel also change often.
We are struck by the professionalism and commitment of the
project teams on both sides: the MoD and the Atlas consortium led
by EDS. But are they working on mission impossible?
They will not want to give up on the DII and we do not think
they should. There have attempts to make the scheme simpler, to
"de-risk" it by breaking it into three increments, and even to
phases within these. But there is a danger the "one-size-fits-all"
technology could become so simple that it is derided or even
avoided by users who will keep to their existing systems - thus
leaving them with two computers where they had one before.
Like the
NHS IT programme also - NPfIT - the assumptions that underlay
the award of the Defence Information Infrastructure contract need,
in the light of experiences so far, to be tested by an independent,
published review, at least to assess unemotionally what is, and
what is not, achievable.
Ministers do not like independent reviews of major IT programmes
because investigators are likely to find things that could
embarrass them, such as fundamental weaknesses. But there is too
much at stake for ministers to put potential embarrassment before
concern for the troops who are already under great pressure and the
teams that are trying to get a project of labyrinthine complexity
on track.