EU trading partners could shun the UK over its role in the Echelon
monitoring system
W hen I first wrote about the disquieting report on political
control prepared by the
Omega Foundation and presented to the European
Parliament's Scientific and Technical Options Assessment panel two
years ago, one of the most disconcerting revelations was the likely
existence of the global monitoring network called Echelon.
Since then, much has happened - not least because many others have
been disturbed by what the report revealed and further hinted at.
Indeed, many politicians within the European Union - outside the
UK, of course, since the UK is deeply implicated in the Echelon
system - have called for more information on this top-secret
activity and measures to limit its effect on EU citizens.
This has led to the preparation of an official report by the
European Parliament's Temporary Committee on the Echelon
Interception System. For an interim version click
here.
It is a fascinating document, and should be read by anyone involved
with online security issues - in other words, all those conducting
business over the Internet.
Although it is only tangentially about the interception of
Net-based communications, it provides an excellent primer on this
and other kinds of eavesdropping. One of its chief values lies in
establishing beyond doubt the existence of the Echelon system -
something that the US government to this day still has the
effrontery to deny.
The report is also valuable because it puts fears about total
monitoring systems in a sensible and well-researched context. It
emphasises two important points.
First, it seems likely that the current Echelon system is already
overloaded in terms of routine searches for suspicious terms -
"bomb", "drugs" etc - and hence is vulnerable to the systematic use
of random noise words in messages to overwhelm its automatic
keyword detection systems. The regular use of even low-grade
encryption will further blunt the power of this approach.
The second point brought out by the report is that the US
authorities can spy on European data networks at an acceptable cost
only with the connivance of European governments.
What makes this relevant is the UK's Regulation of Investigatory
Powers (RIP) Act, which was passed last year. As I reported at the
time, this basically grants the UK Government disproportionate
powers to eavesdrop on data transmissions in the UK. Combined with
the routine swapping of confidential information between Echelon
spying partners, a further pernicious aspect of the RIP Act
emerges: it essentially provides Echelon with just the foothold in
Europe that it needs to spy on those in the UK.
This affects not only UK nationals. Any data passing through the UK
will be vulnerable to US analysis thanks to Echelon. Ironically,
this may prove the downfall of the Echelon system in its present
form. The European Union is rightly concerned about information
about European nationals being passed to the US spy masters.
There seem likely to be two important consequences. First, the UK
will become even more of an e-pariah: European companies will
naturally be reluctant to set up subsidiaries here if their data
flows will be vulnerable and potentially subject to US
analysis.
More importantly, the EU is likely to demand that the UK decides
exactly whom it regards as its main working partners. It is not
possible for the UK Government to deliver up confidential
commercial information about its European trading partners to the
US authorities and still be regarded as part of the core European
club.
The current political context, where issues of European integration
are well to the fore, means that the appearance of this report,
even in its provisional form, is an important event. Whatever
happens on the European front, it seems certain that the old-boy
spy network known as Echelon will never be the same again.
Glyn Moody