The Whitehall IT review was received with mixed emotions by users,
suppliers and analysts. Mike Simons reports
Relief, amazement and a hint of cynicism typified the IT
industry's reaction to the Government's review of major IT projects
that was published last week.
There was relief because the report encapsulates best practice,
draws lessons from past failures, offers clear proposals for change
and meaningful timescales for its implementation.
The amazement comes from the fact that so many obvious mistakes
were repeated so often. The report's authors admit early on, "Many
of the reasons why IT-related change has frequently failed have
been known for some time. Translating that knowledge into practice
is not easy."
The cynicism has its roots in the knowledge that the corridors
of power are lined with volumes on best practice. The question is,
will this report simply join the others?
Some things are demonstrably different from the past. One is New
Labour's commitment to make IT work. The Modernising Government
agenda will stand or fall on IT.
A second difference is that this new policy is transparent and
has an owner, the e-envoy Alex Allan.
Launching the report Allan said, "This will not be left on the
shelves of Whitehall to gather dust. All recommendations set out
actions, owners and delivery dates and I will work to ensure it
makes a real difference."
Allan's enthusiasm and commitment has won support in Whitehall.
Jonathon Baume, general secretary of the senior civil servants
group the First Division Association, said, "These are eminently
sensible proposals. They show the Government and civil service
learning lessons. It is important they are implemented
quickly."
The core of the policy is about strengthening the skills base of
the civil service and changing its corporate culture so it can deal
more effectively with suppliers. It will not be easy.
Rob McCallough, head of the IT practice at law firm Masons,
said, "The report recommends that Senior Responsible Owners for
every project be virtually 'hard wired' across government. This is
to be accomplished by an appraisal and reward system. But
individual accountability is a concept not generally present within
the public sector."
To succeed McCallough suggested civil servants remuneration
packages would have to rise to match those in the private sector
and asked, "What happens to an unsuccessful SRO?"
Bloor analyst Martin Brampton saw other problems. "Talk of
cultural change is important," he said. "You should stop the
rotation of civil servants so it is impossible for them to see
projects through."
However, he was wary of heaping too much pressure on the SRO.
"IT service contracts are error prone and you must allow room to
make mistakes."
Baume thought his members would relish, rather than fear, the
opportunities and skills the proposals offer and said it offered
the hope of "putting greater discipline on the private sector".
Management of suppliers and outsourcers is a second key theme of
the document. The major IT companies, through the Computing
Services & Software Association, had considerable input into
the Cabinet Office review and have welcomed the report.
Behind the scenes, however, some suppliers have worries. One
said, "The Cabinet Office has taken our suggestions and come up
with proposals that seem totally internal to the civil
service."
Another feared that the proposals would delay IT projects and
increase the cost of doing business with the Government.
The problem was summed up by a senior figure with a major IT
supplier, who said, "Partnership is fine, but we've necessarily got
a different agenda to the Government."
Cabinet Office minister Ian McCartney was aware of this at a
briefing to launch the policy last week. He called for partnership
with suppliers but warned them, that if government was "seen as a
soft option in the past, we will not be any more".
The government inquiry team said the most common criticism of
suppliers was, "fielding a highly-skilled team of IT practitioners
during the tender evaluation process but substituting weaker
personnel after the contract had been awarded".
The document called on the Office of Government Commerce (OGC)
to benchmark IT suppliers and the spread of information on their
performance across government.
However, at a recent meeting, the Commons Public Accounts
Committee heard Nick Montague, chairman of the Inland Revenue, and
EDS director Alan Stevens discuss the problems of benchmarking and
finding suitable comparators.
The OGC is still carving out a role for itself amidst rumours of
Whitehall infighting and interdepartmental rivalry. Both McCartney
and OGC chief Peter Gershon last week refused to say what sanctions
would be imposed on failing suppliers.
Government projects that failed to live up to their
dreams
Post Office/Benefits Agency Horizon project
This very large project central to the business of a number of
public sector organisations, and justified on the basis of a shared
business case, did not establish single ownership of the business
case and project until two years after contract signing.
By this time, much of the original value of the business case
had been eroded. The lack of a single point with overall
responsibility for the project caused difficulties from the
beginning, as the different organisations had varying degrees of
commitment to the project objectives.
Immigration and Nationality Directorate
The project was designed to alter the working practices of a
government body, employing extensive new technology, but focused
too heavily on the commercial aspects of the agreement with its
supplier.
While the contract seemed to offer excellent value for money,
the project fell into difficulties because technical and management
issues led to severe delays. The good commercial deal was not a
substitute for satisfactory service.
National Air Traffic Control Swanwick Centre
The use of a fixed-price contract in one project meant that the
requirement had to be reduced when the supplier's losses became too
great.
The price was shown to be far below actual cost. The supplier
had also promised unrealistic target dates.
Post Office/Benefits Agency Horizon project
This very large project central to the business of a number of
public sector organisations, and justified on the basis of a shared
business case, did not establish single ownership of the business
case and project until two years after contract signing.
By this time, much of the original value of the business case
had been eroded. The lack of a single point with overall
responsibility for the project caused difficulties from the
beginning, as the different organisations had varying degrees of
commitment to the project objectives.
Immigration and Nationality Directorate
The project was designed to alter the working practices of a
government body, employing extensive new technology, but focused
too heavily on the commercial aspects of the agreement with its
supplier.
While the contract seemed to offer excellent value for money,
the project fell into difficulties because technical and management
issues led to severe delays. The good commercial deal was not a
substitute for satisfactory service.
National Air Traffic Control Swanwick Centre
The use of a fixed-price contract in one project meant that the
requirement had to be reduced when the supplier's losses became too
great.
The price was shown to be far below actual cost. The supplier
had also promised unrealistic target dates.